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Editorial  
 
 
 
FRIENDSHIP—AROUND MICHAEL H. MITIAS’ FRIENDSHIP:  
A CENTRAL MORAL VALUE 
 
 
The main theme of this Dialogue and Universalism issue is friendship. The 
object of investigations and/or inspiration the here presented papers on friend-
ship is Michael H. Mitias’ book Friendship: A Central Moral Value.1 In this 
very modest way Dialogue and Universalism would like to honour Professor 
Mitias—by paying attention to one of his many, though interrelated, fields of 
research. We have decided to follow Mitias’ interest in friendship also because 
this virtue plays such a significant role in human life—in its individual as well 
as in social scale—that it repeatedly must be given attention it merits. Alt-
hough—as one of the authors, Ruth Abbey, informs—some books on friendship 
have been published in the last years friendship is still a neglected issue, mainly 
because philosophy has rarely addressed the alarming condition of friendship in 
recent times. And it is Mitias who restores friendship in the variant that has 
been rooted in the human world over the centuries, reactivates it and postulates 
to assign it the role of a founding item of postmodern morality; Necip Fikri 
Alican elucidates this in detail in his paper. This recent period has abandoned 
many basic traditional values apparently “for the sake of modernization” as 
many ideologies try to convince us, in fact imposing or sanctioning our world 
order run by economic interests and benefits.   
The Dialogue and Universalism editorial team is pleased to present here 
three extensive essays on Mitias’ conception of friendship and his deep-going 
deliberations on this subject. The essays include analyses, discussions and trace 
the grounding of Mitias’ conception in philosophical traditions. Also, the col-
lection includes two other studies that do not refer directly to Mitias’ book but 
are thematically closely related to it.  
Following Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book VIII), in philosophy 
friendship is commonly treated as an ethical issue and as lying in the individual 
————————— 
1 Mitias, M. H. 2012. Friendship: A Central Moral Value. Amsterdam–New York: Rodopi. 
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subject’s sphere. However, like the majority of ethical issues, also the question 
of friendship inevitably extends to philosophical anthropology, especially to the 
problems of human being’s nature, natural, primitive features, needs and aspira-
tions as well as  those imposed from outside, issues of individual identity, free-
dom and autonomy in the face of friendship, and individualistic tendencies ver-
sus togetherness. 
Today the necessary extension of the scope of friendship goes farther on, 
namely to the sphere of society, culture, and civilization. Friendship is becom-
ing a serious problem in all those domains, and cannot be viewed any longer 
only as an intimate relationship between two persons, a relationship devoid of 
socio-cultural influence and commitment. Recent socio–cultural phenomena 
have among others things led to the collapse or distortion of authentic human 
togetherness. We are witnessing the frightening disappearance of authentic 
friendly relationships. The very idea and value of friendship has been devalued 
and is currently turning into its own caricature or an empty illusion. 
Paradoxically, new communication media are taking part in this degradation. 
Facebook and other social networking websites and services are changing the 
intimate, private relation of being friends into collecting “likes.” Mobile 
phones’ texting extremely shallows conversations, and also—if they become the 
dominating form of communication—intimate contacts and exchange between 
humans.  
However, the degradation of friendship is mainly caused not by the flaws or 
side-effects of technical innovations. It is first of all a result of social changes, 
of changing social goals, needs, and lifestyles. Societies around the world are 
more and more strongly controlled by the rules of the Darwinian struggle for 
life, by selfish interests, by the continuous state of competition between people, 
by hostility toward the Other. One serious and pressing modern-day misery—in 
fact a widespread social disease—is loneliness, which is among other things an 
effect of the waning of friendship on the global scale (Mitias says a lot about 
loneliness and exclusion in his works, also Manjulika Ghosh writes about this 
phenomenon in her essay). People are lonely in the overpopulated world, in 
crowds, in societies, even in their families, because there are two dominant 
forms of human contacts: in the process of realising common interests, and in 
leisure. People are losing the ability to live authentically together, to be in self-
less and emotionally involved relationships. The minimal and at the same time 
crucial benefit of friendship is avoiding loneliness.  
Till now the postmodern “friendship”—or, in fact, friendship in the era of 
late capitalism, an era in which millions were excluded, baffled and beaten, an 
era of the collapse of solidarity (with people seeming to unite only against an 
enemy or for the sake of common interests)—has not been considered by ethi-
cists and anthropologists with attention it deserves. The threat of a human world 
wholly devoid of friendship, togetherness, empathy, in other words, a human-
kind consisting of isolated strangers, opens a new path of philosophical investi-
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gation. It seems that friendship is not only an ethical value embracing two indi-
viduals, but also a social value and dependent on socio-cultural factors. As such 
it also could be an object of investigation in social philosophy. This should ex-
amine why friendship changes for worse in this world, which frequently speaks 
of itself as the best and most civilised world in human history. Philosophy 
should also study obstacles to friendship in today’s multi-ethnical, multi-
cultural and multi-religious world. In general, new conditions, situations and 
phenomena in the human world, which is in a constant state of flux, inspire 
philosophy—by founding new philosophical questions, followed by ideas, re-
search, and conceptions.  
 
The second part of this Dialogue and Universalism issue, entitled IDEALS 
UNIVERSAL VALUES, DIALOGUE, includes papers on the main topics dis-
cussed in this journal: the ideals and values underlying the praxis of the human 
world. And as for dialogue—this time we present two entirely different instanc-
es of dialogue: a dialogue between Christianity and Judaism (Shoshana Ronen), 
and a dialogue between philosophy and physics (Hisaki Hashi and Herbert  
Pietschmann).   
 
Małgorzata Czarnocka 
professor of philosophy 
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ANGELIQUE:  
AN ANGEL IN DISTRESS, MORALITY IN CRISIS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Michael H. Mitias argues that friendship is a central moral value constituting an in-
tegral part of the good life and therefore deserving a prominent place in ethical theory. 
He consequently calls upon ethicists to make immediate and decisive adjustments 
toward accommodating what he regards as a neglected organic relationship between 
friendship and morality. This is not a fanciful amendment to our standard conception of 
morality but a radical proposal grounded in a unifying vision to recapture the right way 
of doing ethics. While the assessment is compelling, and the plea well-placed, neither 
has been fully understood in the scholarly reception of Mitias. This paper clarifies both. 
What sets it apart from other reactions to Mitias is a holistic approach drawing on liter-
ary considerations as well as philosophical ones. The combined aim is to demonstrate 
that Mitias is not seeking simply to restore friendship to its rightful place in normative 
ethical theory, which is indeed the full extent of his formal mission, but that he is seek-
ing to do so specifically within virtue ethics. This interpretation rests on a broad engage-
ment with Mitias’s publications beyond the recent treatise often taken understandably yet 
erroneously to be his only work on the subject. 
Keywords: friendship, Humanism, moral theory, virtue ethics, ontology of value. 
 
 
 
I’m afraid we’ve fallen in with arguments about 
friendship that are no better than con artists. 
 
Plato, Lysis 218d 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a comprehensive study of Mitias’s philosophy of friendship. The 
approach is analytic, exploratory, and interpretive. The inspiration binding these 
perspectives together is the impression that Mitias’s campaign to have ethicists 
acknowledge friendship as a central moral value with a definitive role in ethical 
theory is a drive toward virtue ethics conceived from within virtue ethics. This 
impression originates in two principles of interpretation common and peculiar 
to the works of Mitias: (1) Anything Mitias writes on friendship or love is al-
ways at the same time on morality and ethics. (2) Everything Mitias writes is on 
friendship or love and therefore also on morality and ethics.1 
The focus is largely, though not exclusively, on Friendship: A Central Moral 
Value (2012a). That book is commonly taken to be Mitias’s only work on friend-
ship. It is not. It is his only treatise on the subject. Including that one, his last six 
books are all either on friendship or on love, most of them on both, given that 
there is no friendship without love.2 In accordance with the two interpretive 
principles above, all six books are also on morality and ethics.3 This is not some-
thing I aspire to prove here severally for each book. The collective evidence will 
come out naturally in the course of defending the central thesis that the expecta-
tions of Mitias regarding friendship are best met through virtue ethics, perhaps 
solely through virtue ethics, though I will not press the latter issue. 
As is the case with all his recent publications, his only treatise on friendship 
is grounded firmly in virtue ethics through an attempt, explicit there, implicit in 
his other works, to establish friendship as a central moral value. The title alone 
shows immediately that Mitias is after both, with the main title invoking friend-
ship and the subtitle adding morality. The book devotes ample attention both to 
friendship and to moral philosophy, making a compelling case for why the first 
is indispensable for the second, while showing us along the way that the reverse 
is true as well. Yet the focus on restoring friendship to its rightful place as a 
central moral value leaves virtue ethics in the background despite its being the 
very place the restoration is to be made. I aim to bring it out into the foreground 
through a combination of literary and philosophical considerations. 
————————— 
1 The scope of consideration, deliberately limited in order to isolate a significant pattern, is 
books published over the last ten years. I do not mean to ignore the work of Mitias in the field of 
aesthetics or to overlook his status as a preeminent Hegel scholar. Those contributions are simply 
outside the frame of reference. As for the interpretive principles presented above, they are both 
perfectly accurate within the scope of consideration. The first one is just as accurate without 
limitation or qualification. 
2 The other five books are: Love Letters: The Abyss of Loneliness (2009); Seeking God: A Mys-
tic’s Way (2012b); My Father the Immigrant: In the Light of Love (2013a); Love Poems from  
a Mystic (2013b); Justice under the Ax of the Absurd (2017). 
3 A seventh book of the same nature, further corroborating the two interpretive principles 
above, was published concurrently with the present volume, though it was not available for in-
spection at the time of writing: Tears of Love (2018). 
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The reason for employing literary considerations alongside philosophical 
ones is that Mitias himself is a literary artist as well as a professional philoso-
pher. While his latest book on friendship is a treatise, and not a work of litera-
ture, that is a verifiable departure from the modus operandi of Mitias, whose 
recent contributions have otherwise all been literary works, mostly philosophi-
cal novels.4 True to that trend, and reflecting the habituation therein, the key to 
unlocking the full impact of his treatise goes through a literary device deployed 
with passion near the beginning of the book, an apparently personal anecdote 
concerning Angelique, an angelic heroine whose raison d'être seems to have 
escaped the attention of commentators, at least judging by the absence of a ref-
erence to her in their reactions.5 My suspicion is that this supposedly veridical 
story, capturing as it does the very crisis troubling Mitias in regard to both mo-
rality and moral theory, is a metaphor he invents and interjects as a map to the 
corresponding thesis, defense, and conclusion. And that map, as I intend to show, 
plots a course through virtue ethics. 
As for philosophical considerations, they bear the main burden of demon-
stration, since interpretive authority in a disquisition cannot reasonably be as-
signed to symbolism ahead of argumentation. Even so, I am convinced that 
there is more to be gained here from literary analysis than from an expository 
and critical review of the arguments, which are clear enough on their own. This 
appeal to clarity is not intended to beg the question of the tenability of Mitias’s 
thesis. My claim is not that his position is unassailable, or his arguments infalli-
ble, but that both are easy to follow. Indeed, the critical reception to date has 
been one of agreement or disagreement, not confusion or perplexity.6 This is why 
I believe that exploring the literary perspective, since it affords direct insight 
into highly relevant material that would otherwise be ignored, might be particu-
larly rewarding. 
A philosophical appraisal is, of course, still necessary. But it should ideally 
expand our understanding of what Mitias has already accomplished. In an effort 
to add something new to the reactions currently in circulation, I offer not just an 
exposition and evaluation of the main arguments but also an exploration of how 
to go about restoring friendship to its rightful place as a central moral value in 
ethical theory. What this amounts to is a philosophical appraisal that builds up 
to a judgment on what can and must be done if Mitias is right about friendship 
as opposed to an appraisal concluding merely with agreement or disagreement 
on whether he is right about it. 
I submit, and aim to demonstrate, that the best way to meet the demands 
Mitias places on normative ethical theory in regard to friendship, given the na-
ture of his position as reflected in his observations, inferences, and conclusions, 
————————— 
4 See the references in note 2. 
5 See Abbey (2013), Gehrman (2014), Lynch (2014), and Mulvey (2013), each discussed 
separately below in section four of the paper. 
6 See the references in note 5. 
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is through virtue ethics. This reading has the advantage of exposing the most 
promising path for carrying out the revival project Mitias has been promoting, 
while also removing some of the obstacles that have already been laid out in his 
path by critics. Complementing this effort, the final portion of the paper takes 
up specific objections, especially those that are not met obviously or decisively 
either by symbolism or by analysis, to make sure Mitias is understood as intend-
ed even where his ideas are rejected as presented. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in three sections as follows: Section 
two explores the literary perspective, dissecting the anecdotal metaphor men-
tioned above as a precursor to the central thesis and supporting arguments.  
Section three reviews the rationale behind Mitias’s position in an effort to  
determine our best option for dealing with the problem he describes and for 
implementing the solution he recommends. Section four surveys the critical 
reception to clear up misunderstandings and to weed out polemical objections 
so as to expose the philosophical dialectic underneath. The combination shows 
that Mitias’s Friendship (2012a) is better understood as a call to respond specif-
ically through virtue ethics to a crisis in moral philosophy than it might be as  
a methodologically indifferent survey of friendship as a central moral value. 
 
 
2. LITERARY INTERPRETATION 
 
Mitias writes from the heart. He bares his soul, not just as an inamorato 
drafting Love Letters (2009), or a troubadour composing Love Poems (2013b), 
or a mystic Seeking God (2012b), or a prisoner defending Justice under the Ax 
of the Absurd (2017), but also, and perhaps most passionately, as a philosopher 
reflecting on the human condition. His approach to Friendship (2012a) is no 
different. In a pivotal section of the very first chapter, just as he is laying out the 
analytic tools he intends to use throughout the book, Mitias interrupts his meth-
odological exposition to tell a story. With the basic model barely set up, this 
seems to be no place for a digression, especially not for a peripheral narrative. 
But it is the perfect place to emulate Plato in resorting to storytelling to make 
sure the gravity of the point is appreciated even where the rationale may not be 
accepted.7 
The story is about Angelique, a student of Mitias, who attempts to kill her-
self but winds up in the hospital instead. Having been summoned to the hospital 
————————— 
7 The eschatological myths of the Gorgias (523a–527a), Phaedo (107c–115a), and Republic 
(614a–621d) come to mind. The central myth of the Phaedrus (246e–249d), with the imagery of 
the chariot, is no less memorable. The Symposium, of course, is basically one story after another 
until Alcibiades shows up uninvited and ends up contributing the most personal story of all. And 
the bulk of the Timaeus, in fact, the entirety of the cosmology there, is identified explicitly as  
a “likely story” (eikōs muthos [εἰκώς μῦθος]) or “likely account” (eikōs logos [εἰκώς λόγος]) 
(29b–d ff. passim). All references to Plato are by Stephanus number. Any quotations in English 
are from the Hackett edition of his complete works in translation (Plato 1997). 
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through a phone call from the young woman’s mother, Mitias rushes to Angel-
ique’s bedside just as she is being wheeled out of the emergency room and into 
a regular room (2012a, 21–22). The message is about compassion, empathy, and 
goodwill, no doubt prevalent among friends, but also expected to some extent as 
a human response in relationships short of friendship. 
The tone is set by the nurse, a competent and efficient man tending to Angel-
ique.8 He is a true professional in the primary sense of the word, which he 
demonstrates in response to the gratitude Mitias expresses for his kindness to-
ward Angelique: “I am paid to be kind to my patients” (2012a, 21). He also 
demonstrates considerable enthusiasm for the possibility of a formal commen-
dation: “I hope you can give a good evaluation of my work to my superior” 
(2012a, 21). This dispassionate demonstration of professionalism in what is 
otherwise a moral context disturbs Mitias, not just as the story’s protagonist but 
also as its narrator. 
Mitias introduces the anecdote as a true story: “I shall illustrate what I mean 
by a brief description of an experience I had a few years ago” (2012a, 21). What 
he is offering to “illustrate” here, as he puts it, is a growing tendency he ob-
serves in people to appear moral without being moral. The story he recounts 
indeed illustrates that observation. Yet Mitias communicates the same observa-
tion so clearly in the first place that his exposition requires no further elabora-
tion for intelligibility, not even an illustration. The anecdote that follows does 
not actually prove that there is a growing tendency in people to feign moral 
behavior. It merely illustrates the assertion. Mitias himself admits as much. So, 
why follow a perfectly clear statement with an anecdote that adds nothing to the 
clarity, let alone proving the reality? The most plausible explanation is that the 
story is a purely rhetorical device, a fictional account symbolizing the thesis to 
be demonstrated. It even serves as a roadmap for what is to come, though plot-
ting the directions requires an affinity for metaphors and some patience for in-
terpretive reflection. 
This is the artistic calling card of Mitias. The assignment of a representative 
role to a passage which then illuminates the rest of the book is a literary prefigu-
ration technique he has been cultivating with flair. One example is in Love  
Letters (2009), where opening ruminations on a family tradition revolving 
————————— 
8 Why is the nurse a man? While there is nothing strange about a male nurse, female ones are 
still more common. If Mitias were relating a true story, the nurse’s gender would have been 
whatever it happened to be, irrelevant in either case. But because he is making it up, as I argue 
below, one may be inclined to wonder whether there is a special reason why he is inviting us to 
imagine a male nurse, perhaps bearing a structural if superficial resemblance to what crime 
novelists do with left-handed killers in murder mysteries. In this case, however, there is no hidden 
message. Mitias makes the nurse a man simply to differentiate the pronouns in a passage where 
there are already two women interacting with the narrator who doubles as the protagonist. As the 
nurse is the only man present besides Mitias the character, the reference is perfectly clear in every 
“he,” “him,” or “his,” because Mitias is also the narrator. The clarity would have been diluted 
with a female nurse in the company of two other women. 
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around a box handed down from generation to generation blend into the main 
storyline as a young nephew is entrusted with a mysterious box left behind by  
a dying uncle, whose deeply mystical love letters making up the contents of the 
box determine both the contents and the structure of the book, stringing together 
sixteen of those letters, out of a total of seventy, some of which mention and 
quote other letters, where philosophical messages thus become twice removed 
from the level of narration at the beginning, epitomizing the spirit in which Pla-
to famously declares art twice removed from reality (Republic, 597e, 599d).9 
Another example awaits in My Father the Immigrant (2013a, 1–2), where the 
first chapter, titled “A Short Story,” indeed tells a short story disconnected from 
the novel itself, but it actually serves as a literary and philosophical map to the 
novel in the guise of a foreword by its protagonist. 
As for the methodological counterpart of these in the personalized anecdote 
motivating his treatise on friendship, Mitias is not relating a story he just hap-
pened to recall in a stream of consciousness but inviting the reader to share his 
indignation with false morality. What better way to protest false morality than 
through a fake illustration of it? People pretending to be moral without actually 
being moral, specifically the nurse in the story, is a metaphor for normative 
ethical theories purporting to capture the essence of morality without uncover-
ing the nature of humanity. This is, again, a nod to Plato, as the pretense to mo-
rality (Republic, 358e–367e) goes hand in hand with the vacuity of rhetoric 
(Gorgias, 462c–466a), both schemes depicting a knack for pandering to expec-
tations without meeting specifications. 
The message is a rejection of ethical theories that set out to systematize mo-
rality without devoting adequate attention to the highest good as the source of 
moral obligation. Mitias is opposed to moral codes that are out of touch with 
what it means to be a human being: a bundle of potentiality in the process of 
actualization toward human excellence. Even as a crude filter, the Angelique 
narrative immediately eliminates, among others, divine command theory and 
deontological ethics. Virtue ethics quickly emerges as the most likely candidate 
to survive the filtration process. 
While this is merely an inference to the best explanation, it is unlikely to be 
contradicted by further study. What purpose would the anecdote serve other-
wise? What good would it do, if there were no message, to bring up the matter 
of people pretending to be moral without being moral, given that the book is not 
aiming to reprimand moral agents for not doing their part but to recruit moral 
philosophers to show everyone what that part is. Just as the nurse doing his job 
was acting out of a sense of duty but not out of a sense of goodness, both the 
————————— 
9 The love poem coming before all this, even before the literary prologue laying out the 
philosophical messages, and thus before any of the letters, suggests that love precedes all. This is 
a reflection of how philosophy itself begins with love, at least from an etymological standpoint, 
but arguably also from an existential perspective. It is at the same time a reminder that both 
literature and philosophy are put to their best use through love. 
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word of God and the categorical imperative lay out a course of action in a stipu-
lative manner, not without the possibility of justification but without the benefit 
of explanation. As a result, compliance with either one, while it may in fact be 
the right thing to do, lacks enlightening engagement with moral value and cor-
responding obligations, especially with what makes anything good and why we 
ought to do what we ought to do. Mitias is thus issuing an invitation to virtue 
ethics because he sees it as the most insightful and comprehensive answer to 
how we ought to live as human beings, especially in contrast to a rigoristic re-
sponse to what we ought to do in various circumstances, each determined in 
accordance with a generic formula for appraising the morality of the situation 
without appreciating the humanity in it. 
What Mitias wants, deep down, is for the nurse to hold hands with the moth-
er and with the friend of the family (Mitias himself) to commiserate, if only for 
a minute, before tending to his other duties. He is willing to settle for any sort of 
cordial or sympathetic response liberated to any degree from the contractual 
requirements of the nurse’s job description. But what he is really looking for is 
that extra step to acknowledge the existential reality of the situation and to re-
spond sincerely as a human being rather than strictly as a professional. 
Finding symbolism where none is intended is the most common illusion in 
literary interpretation. But the insight is almost always worth the risk. If there is 
any suspicion that I might be reading too much into a brief anecdote, strangely 
out of place in a philosophical treatise, I invite the reader to reflect upon the 
same assessment by the same author in a different book already mentioned 
above, My Father the Immigrant (2013a): 
 
“Most of the time, what they [patients] need more than anything is a warm 
smile, a gentle touch, or a kind word. It is a shame that we cannot always 
satisfy that need. It is actually an essential part of nursing, but there is never 
enough time for it, especially since affection does not come with a prescrip-
tion; you can always provide more. If there is not enough time for that, we 
must at least be gentle and tolerant. Nursing is a vocation, a way of life, not 
merely a career or an occupation. We have a competent staff here, but only a 
few demonstrate genuine human feeling. I honestly do not know why. When 
you deal with human beings, especially as a health care provider, you first 
have to show that you’re a human being, too. Patients should be treated with 
the dignity they deserve as human beings” (Mitias 2013a, 3). 
 
This assessment is delivered in the form of an unrehearsed speech by the 
head nurse at the cancer ward of the Baptist Hospital in Southaven, Mississippi. 
The words come out spontaneously during a private yet informal orientation 
session for the protagonist, who has just started her job as a nurse at that hospi-
tal. What makes this Mitias’s own assessment rather than just a few lines  
spoken by one of his characters is that Mitias habitually addresses his readers 
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through his characters. But anyone reluctant to trust this generalization, espe-
cially in the form of an unsubstantiated declaration, may rest assured that the 
work just quoted is an autobiographical novel, where the protagonist is the 
daughter of Mikha Midas, who is himself a patient at the hospital in question.10 
The implication for the drama unfolding around Angelique is that Mitias, as 
the author, expects the same thing from the nurse tending to Angelique that he 
expects from his own alter ego, the friend of the family already there for com-
fort and support. His expectations from the nurse may be lower in degree, but 
they are the same in spirit. He does not require the nurse to be a full-fledged 
friend to Angelique, but he does expect him to show some compassion, and per-
haps for a moment, to be a selfless companion, which is the beginning of friend-
ship. Either way, though, whether it is compassion or friendship that the nurse is 
expected to show, we are drawn into the territory of virtue ethics. Mitias reveals 
his hand clearly in the only line he delivers through the nurse, who attributes 
every benefit he has conferred upon Angelique to the requirements of his job, 
thus reducing a moral good to a formal duty, not even to his patient but to his 
employer, as he proceeds to give back in effort what he had received in wages. 
In the briefest of passages, then, Mitias manages to paint the nurse as a deontol-
ogist and to reject the approach in its entirety. 
The man was doing his job, and thus performing his duty, but he was not, as 
far as Mitias is concerned, doing the right thing. And this is not just because he 
asked for something in return for his assistance, not, that is, because he asked 
for a positive review of his performance to be brought to the attention of his 
supervisor. He would have still failed to satisfy Mitias even if he had simply 
said “You are quite welcome. I was only doing my job.” The demands Mitias 
places on morality go beyond duty: “Moral behavior […] is an expression of 
our conscience, of our moral heart. It is a way of actualizing the moral dimen-
sion of our being” (2012a, 22). Even if he had not asked for a favorable review 
in return, the nurse would not have been “actualizing the moral dimension of his 
being” by merely performing his duty, which here happened to be his job, 
showing no awareness that there is more to morality than duty, or put different-
ly, that morality is not exhausted by duty. He was not being moral, because he 
was not living up to his own potential toward excellence, human potential to-
ward human excellence. Both the potential and the excellence, and along with 
them the humanity, were forsaken in this one act. 
The joint protagonists of the story, Mitias and the mother of Angelique, are 
not merely opposed to the moral code demonstrated by the nurse but also ap-
palled and astonished by its implementation. This is not just ethical disagree-
ment or philosophical conflict. It is moral indignation and human outrage. To be 
————————— 
10 Mikha Midas (= Michael Mitias) turns up again in Justice under the Ax of the Absurd (2017), 
which also brings back his daughter Amy Wright, who pens a “Note to the Reader” preceding the 
main text. Not only is Mitias always present in his work but he is also prepared to make that 
presence explicit and unmistakable when the message is dear to his heart. 
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specific, Mitias reports shock for his own part, while observing anger and dis-
appointment in the mother: 
 
“Upon hearing this response a quiet shock streamed violently through my 
veins. My cheeks suddenly became red. Frankly, I was dumbfounded.  
I slowly moved my eyes toward Angelique’s mother. Her face radiated vibes 
of anger and disappointment” (Mitias, 2012a, 21–22). 
 
This is the moral epicenter of the book. The clue is the tension between quiet 
and violence, together spotlighting a Mitias trademark: silent communication. 
Righteous indignation comes out in utter silence through the briefest glance 
conveying the deepest emotions straight from the heart and right through the 
eyes. This is the standard mode of communication in Mitias’s literary treat-
ments of moral approval or censure and in his various depictions of the purest 
exchanges in empathy or sympathy. Even a cursory survey of his recent works 
will confirm that Mitias places great emphasis on silent communication, where 
not one word need be uttered to convey the full range of human emotion, cover-
ing not just positive moods such as elation and compassion but also negative 
ones such as sorrow and anger: 
 
• Love Letters (2009, xii): “I remained silent the entire time. I felt certain in 
my heart that he understood my silence. Do you know, dear reader, that 
silence, human silence, can sometimes speak more, much more meaning-
fully, than words, even more than poetry?” 
• Seeking God (2012b, 134): “Moments later they faced each other silently, 
but their silence was a dialogue, and the medium of the dialogue was 
their sparkling eyes.” 
• My Father the Immigrant (2013a, 189–190): “Our eyes were locked in a 
short moment of silent dialogue; silent, because both of us understood the 
meaning and message of the nasty smell that was floating in the rooms 
and corridors of the hospital.” 
• Love Poems (2013b, 60, 69, 121): “My Friend does not speak—not my 
language, nor yours. / His Presence is his speech, and his meaning is his 
light” (from “You are the Alpha and the Omega,” 60). “Always remem-
ber: The language of reality is silence, / Not the silence of nature, of this 
woman or that man, / But of the kind that speaks the language of The 
Light, / That speaks the unspeakable without speaking!” (from “Before 
the Maple Tree,” 69). “Silence was the only language I spoke, / And he 
was a master speaker in this art” (from “The Only Air Worth Breathing Is 
the Air of Love,” 121). 
• Justice under the Ax of the Absurd (2017, 27): “I consciously replaced the 
blank gaze that emanated from my eyes in the direction of my torturer 
with a gaze of understanding silence—yes, understanding silence.” 
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Such consistency across such variety—a handful of examples representing  
a storehouse of relevant passages—suggests that it is not just the characters 
Mitias creates that communicate in silence but also Mitias himself. This is actu-
ally far more than a suggestion. The confirmation is, again, in the autobiograph-
ical novel, My Father the Immigrant (2013a), where the character of Mikha 
Midas is developed as a silent communicator par excellence: 
 
• “He does not look with his eyes but with his soul; he does not speak with 
his lips but with his heart” (2013a, 3). 
• “I never take his facial expressions lightly. They communicate warmth 
and depth” (2013a, 4). 
• “Mikha did not speak, except with his eyes” (2013a, 192). 
• “I simply gazed into Mikha’s eyes, those eyes that communicated more 
love than I could express” (2013a, 202). 
 
What is it, then, that this silent communicator is telling us with a hospital 
metaphor in a treatise on friendship? Is it just the central character that is having 
an existential crisis or is it all of humanity in her person? Love and friendship, 
above all, require no words for Mitias, as they fully transcend the need for ver-
bal communication, though certainly remaining amenable to it. What he is 
demonstrating here is the urgency of restoring both to their proper place in our 
personal encounters with one another, which we ought always to carry out as 
human beings simpliciter, hence as beings with the same basic needs, desires, 
fears, and frustrations, any imbalance in which is liable to place any one of us in 
distress. 
The nurse’s display of professionalism devoid of humanism is not the only 
sign of opposition to deontological ethics. The symbolism of the anecdote runs 
much deeper than that. And the same factors against deontological ethics are 
aligned just as strongly against divine command theory. We are invited not 
merely to join Mitias and Angelique’s mother in their resentment of the morally 
hollow professionalism of the nurse but also to reflect upon what brought An-
gelique in need of the nurse’s services in the first place: She tried, unsuccessful-
ly, to take her own life. This is a transgression of duty in deontological as well 
as theological terms, as suicide is forbidden both by the categorical imperative 
and by the will of God under any interpretation. Had the focus of the story been 
the cold and calculated response of the nurse, we could have done without the 
suicide storyline. Angelique could have just slipped and fell, been hit by a car, 
or been assaulted by a mugger. She could have encountered any number of mis-
fortunes to place her in the hospital, but no, she tried to commit suicide. Why? 
This is Mitias’s story. He could have picked any crisis at all for the character he 
created. Why did he have her attempt suicide? 
The answer is that Mitias is determined to get us to reflect upon the formal-
ism and rigorism of both deontological ethics and divine command theory, spe-
cifically through the perfect duty one has toward oneself in the former and to-
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ward God in the latter, neither of which evidently had any effect on Angel-
ique—an otherwise “highly intellectual, articulate, kind-hearted, and cultivated 
young woman” (2012a, 21). The message is that duty, rational or divine, is ei-
ther vacuous or altogether meaningless, and most certainly otiose, unless we 
recognize and appreciate the humanity sanctioning that duty. We know that 
either the recognition or the appreciation, or possibly both, are lacking in the 
given context, as Angelique tried to destroy a human being in the making: her-
self. And we know that she was, and still is, a human being in the making, a 
bundle of potentiality in the process of actualization. We know the latter be-
cause we have all the telltale signs: intellectual, articulate, kind-hearted, culti-
vated. The list covers both reason (intellectual, articulate) and virtue (kind-
hearted, cultivated). What Angelique needs the most, then, is not a specialist 
performing his duty (doing his job) but a friend inspiring and encouraging her to 
combine and cultivate her own reason and virtue better than she has been able to 
do on her own. This is not to say that, having been brought back to life from the 
clutches of death, Angelique requires no medical attention, but that she requires 
more than that, some portion of which could easily be provided by the same 
people providing the medical attention, evidently even through the briefest 
glance conveying goodwill. 
Mitias is at pains to infuse the anecdote with apparently superfluous details 
that actually highlight the morality of the situation. While this is clear from the 
suicide attempt alone, given that it is forbidden not just by the categorical im-
perative but also by the will of God as recognized in any version of theism, he 
adds layer upon layer of detail to the story to make sure we get the message, 
particularly the religious dimension. Why else would Mitias the character be 
summoned to Angelique’s bedside through a phone call taking him to the emer-
gency room of a hospital with a religious affiliation? Why are they even at the 
hospital? Could Mitias not have been comforting Angelique at her own home 
after the suicide attempt? 
No, Mitias the author strategically conjures up a desperate phone call taking 
Mitias the character, together with the audience of the book, to the emergency 
room at St. Mary Hospital, not just any hospital but St. Mary Hospital, and not 
just the hospital but the emergency room. The phone call symbolizes a human 
plea, the emergency room represents the urgency of the situation, and the name 
of the hospital introduces a religious dimension. Angelique is already at St. 
Mary, with Mother Mary and thereby within reach of Jesus, yet the grace of 
God is not enough. Neither the Kantian perfect duty to oneself nor the religious 
inculcation regarding the sanctity of life has proven sufficient to keep Angel-
ique from attempting suicide. 
Her name is no accident either. It is a reminder that mortal problems do not 
come with divine solutions. Angelique is an angel—an angel in distress. She 
has fallen from heaven. What she needs is a human touch, which her mother 
recognizes and attempts to secure with a phone call to a trusted and valued 
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friend, Mitias the character. This is the same call that Mitias the author is issu-
ing on behalf of humanity and in the name of reason and morality. He finds the 
state of moral discourse in just as much need of attention as he does Angelique. 
The crisis is so urgent for Mitias that he abandons his firmly established 
mode of expression as a literary artist exploring the mystical experience, revert-
ing here in this book, if only temporarily, to his roots as a professional philoso-
pher pursuing the truth in a dialectical effort to make it accessible to others. 
This is the morally obligatory return to the cave for Mitias, who started out as 
an academic philosopher with a steady output of scholarly books and articles on 
topics ranging from ethics to aesthetics to social and political philosophy, thus 
with a broad range within value theory, moving on afterwards to a more person-
al contemplation of life in general, and the good life in particular, explored 
through philosophical novels complemented by a book of poetry. This period of 
enlightenment, following the earlier period of development, is the culmination 
of a process of self-actualization for Mitias, compelled thereby to return to the 
cave to share his own insight in language more fitting for those who have not 
yet seen the sun.11 This is the reason for his temporary departure from philo-
sophical fiction, promptly resumed with Justice under the Ax of the Absurd 
(2017), followed by Tears of Love (2018). 
His immersion in literature should not be confused with a departure from 
philosophy. The difference is only in the mode of expression. It is all philoso-
phy. And it is all specifically value theory, always with an eye to uncovering the 
human perspective. This book, Friendship: A Central Moral Value (2012a), has 
been underway for a long time, both before and after its publication. A more 
literal way of looking at this deliberate contradiction between before and after is 
that Mitias has been promoting the ideals in this book for a long time. But the 
best way of putting it, though more literary than literal, perhaps even Borgesian, 
is that this book has been, and continues to be, written over and over. This is all 
Mitias ever writes about. 
Everything Mitias writes is on friendship, or on love, which is the foundation 
of friendship. And everything Mitias writes is on morality, which is built on 
both, or at least ought to be. That is the central message of this book as well as 
others coming before it and after it. Page after page of his recent works will 
attest to his dedication to seeing and bringing out the best in humanity: 
 
• Love Letters (2009, 185): “ ‘The basis of true friendship,’ she asserted, 
‘is moral goodness, not material advantage. Moral goodness is what 
makes friendship a spiritual relationship’.” 
————————— 
11 His sensitivity to his own actualization (thus to his self-actualization) and his sense of 
responsibility toward promoting the same in others reflect his devotion to the Aristotelian 
principle of the actualization of potentiality as the essence of excellence (both in general and in 
human beings). 
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• Seeking God (2012b, 160): “He exemplified the noblest qualities of 
friendship, the true spirit of giving and sharing, not from a selfish mo-
tive but from good will.” 
• My Father the Immigrant (2013a, 176): “A wise man once said that 
the glory of friendship lies not in the fact that my friend will sit by my 
side when I am sick and lonely, but in the fact that I can sit by his side 
when he is sick and lonely.”12 
• Love Poems (2013b, 45, 60, 88): “Your beauty is a sun to my eyes, / 
Goodness to my heart, and power to my will” (from “At the Altar of 
Your Radiant Beauty,” 45). “How can there be life without you, my 
Friend?” (from “You are the Alpha and the Omega,” 60). “Do not be-
lieve them, please, / But love them and hug them, anyway” (from 
“How Was the Sun of the Human Heart Eclipsed?” 88). 
• Justice under the Ax of the Absurd (2017, 49): “Two persons love 
each other and grow in their friendship, not from a selfish motive, and 
not because of some advantage, although friendship is a most advan-
tageous relationship, but from good will.” 
 
These passages reflect variations on a theme. They repudiate personal ad-
vantage and embrace goodness, or the good, particularly in the form of good-
will, predicated upon and emanating from a good will, which Kant was not 
wrong to emphasize but perhaps hasty to codify as the only thing that is good in 
itself (good without qualification), leading him to neglect other essential aspects 
and attributes of the humanity in which it originates. And it is this same empha-
sis Mitias places on goodwill grounded in a good will that makes divine com-
mand superfluous in the sphere of moral justification and therefore in the whole 
of ethical theory (another nod to Plato, this time, to the Euthyphro). 
The two works of fiction corresponding to the first and last entries in the 
preceding list both build up to a formal address, a soliloquy of sorts, by a pro-
tagonist engaged in a scholarly presentation on the nature of friendship, much 
like the one by the author himself in the treatise on friendship under discussion 
here. The one in Love Letters (2009, 184–187) is an artless yet erudite delivery 
by a character initiated in the mysteries of love and friendship. The one in Jus-
tice under the Ax of the Absurd (2017, 49–51), constituting part of the second 
chapter, appropriately titled “In Quest of a Genuine Human Being,” is an out-
growth of the presentation in Love Letters (2009, 184–187). The fifth chapter of 
this recent novel of Mitias is, in fact, titled “Friendship Sprouts in Mikha’s and 
————————— 
12 Arguably more telling than specific quotes is the fact that one of the entries in this anthology 
of love poems is entirely about friendship: “Between Friends” (2013b, 53–54). This reflects the 
ontological and axiological relationship Mitias sees between love and friendship, while the clear 
indication that the friend (“Friend”) is God, expressly verified at the outset to make sure the 
association is not missed (2013b, 5), confirms the ultimate value he assigns to friendship. This is 
no accident, or fleeting fancy, as it is complemented by several other poems that persistently 
invoke the “Friend” as God and vice versa. 
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Dr. Tareq’s Hearts.” But Mitias waits no further than the second chapter to 
bring out the connections between love, friendship, and morality: 
 
“Goodness is the origin and aim of the love that unites two persons in the 
bond of friendship; and it is also the glue that cements it and makes it last-
ing” (Mitias 2017, 49).13 
 
This quotation captures the spirit and rationale of everything Mitias has ever 
written on the subject and can be found in different words expressed by differ-
ent characters in all of his recent works. The point it makes is that friendship is a 
moral good, and conversely, that morality is incomplete without love and friend-
ship. His only treatise on the subject, analyzed more fully in the next section, is 
dedicated to demonstrating this relationship through a dialectical approach 
complementing all the artistic ones preceding and following it. 
 
 
3. PHILOSOPHICAL APPRAISAL 
 
The premise of the book is that friendship as a central moral value has been 
neglected in the western philosophical tradition for sixteen hundred years, 
roughly between the fourth and twentieth centuries, extending from the end of 
the Stoic era to the present (2012a, 1). The deficit of attention starts specifically 
with the adoption of Christianity as the state religion of the Roman Empire in 
AD 380, with the other end remaining open except for a revival of interest in the 
last few years (2012a, 3, cf. 217, note 4). It thus covers the medieval, modern, 
and contemporary periods, allowing for exceptions in recent scholarship. The 
thesis is that this neglect is both unjustified (without good reason) and unfortu-
nate (productive of bad results) and therefore in need of full and immediate 
correction. 
The neglect here is academic rather than general. Mitias is not protesting the 
absence of friendship among people but the absence of the concept from moral 
discourse, as conducted mostly by philosophers but also by theologians. He 
does touch upon approaches to friendship among ordinary people as he tracks 
social patterns and sociological developments throughout the periods under 
consideration. But that effort is largely in support of his primary appeal to pro-
fessional philosophers. The call he ultimately makes for the restoration of 
————————— 
13 Among the numerous counterparts of this statement in Friendship: A Central Moral Value, 
two in particular stand out: (1) “We are not amiss at all if we say that the foundation of harmony 
between friends is the fact that they are good and that the pursuit of the good is the ultimate 
principle of their lives” (2012a, 69). (2) “This insight underlies the argument I have advanced in 
this, final chapter: namely, friendship is an ontological need, primarily because it is an essential 
element of human nature. Goodness is its source, and goodness constitutes the structure of the 
relation which makes it possible!” (2012a, 215). 
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friendship to its rightful place in moral discourse addresses ethicists, or at most 
philosophers and theologians in general, not laypersons. Strictly speaking, Miti-
as is opposed to the neglect of friendship both in scholarly contributions to nor-
mative ethics and among moral agents in the general population, but his thesis 
in the book is exclusively about the relevant scholarship. 
His objection regarding the scholarship is not that friendship has not been 
receiving any attention at all in academia but that it has not been receiving any 
where it counts the most, moral discourse. The difference is important: Mitias 
has no problems with either the quantity or the quality of academic output on 
friendship in the periods under investigation. Quite the contrary, aiming to pre-
clude potential misunderstandings in that regard, he makes a special effort to 
acknowledge the existence of a plethora of works on friendship in all the peri-
ods in which it was otherwise neglected as a central moral value in ethical theo-
ry (2012a, 2–3). What he does object to is the absence of friendship from schol-
arly discussion in moral philosophy, particularly where the aim is to determine 
the first principle of morality, or as Mitias puts it, the “principle of moral dis-
tinction,” to wit, the philosophical delineation of the difference between good 
and bad, and right and wrong. His concern, therefore, is with the locus of omis-
sion: normative ethics. 
His objective is to demonstrate that friendship has been neglected exactly as 
specified, that the neglect has been unjustifiable as well as detrimental, and that 
it is therefore in need of immediate attention toward restoration. This creates 
two tasks, one of documentation, the other of substantiation. Mitias approaches 
both at once through a historical survey, which he conducts not just with an 
expository aim but also with a critical eye. He thus proceeds to document the 
omission from each of the periods in question—medieval, modern, contempo-
rary—while also substantiating the charge of neglect as wrongful omission. 
The survey begins with the Hellenic and Hellenistic periods to establish  
a baseline for the neglect to be diagnosed in subsequent periods (2012a, 33–59, 
61–86). The first two periods represent acknowledgment, or rather out-and-out 
advocacy, of friendship as a central moral value essential for the good life. This is 
why Mitias studies them so closely in his initiative to expose and illustrate exactly 
what is missing in later periods. The Hellenic period (2012a, 35–44), observes 
Mitias, is characterized by a metaphysical orientation, a teleological worldview, 
and a humanistic cultural temperament. The Hellenistic period (2012a, 44–59), in 
comparison, exhibits individualism, cosmopolitanism, and realism. Both empha-
size the prominence of reason in human affairs, especially its role in human in-
quiry, with humanism serving as a common denominator as it becomes even 
more inclusive. The human in “humanism,” exclusively Greek in the Hellenic 
period, where the polis is the center of the world, becomes anonymously human 
in the Hellenistic period, where the polis is replaced by the cosmopolis. This is  
a response to the imperial expansionism bringing an end to the city-state, original-
ly with Philip II of Macedon and irreversibly with Alexander the Great. 
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Despite their differences, the two Greek periods jointly inaugurating western 
civilization agree on two fundamental points that bring them together on the 
nature and value of friendship: (1) They both see the essence of humanity as 
natural, that is, as part of the natural world, and therefore as intrinsically valua-
ble, something to be cherished and nurtured in and of itself. (2) They both take 
the task of moral theory to be the study of the good life. The main difference 
between the two periods is an expanding cultural frame of reference, which the 
demise of the city-state as an independent political unit, together with the cor-
relative rise of imperialism, transforms from a tribal orientation to a global con-
figuration. Yet friendship as a central moral value survives that transition, as the 
superlative value attached to the meaning of life as a human being, a bundle of 
potentiality to be actualized through the good life, continues to inform their 
moral outlook (2012a, 66–75, 76–86).  
The medieval period (2012a, 87–119) represents the first break with the an-
cient conception of friendship as a central moral value. The break is anchored to 
religious developments, namely to the growing popularity of Christianity, which 
came to control the strongest empire in the world with the Roman Catholic 
Church establishing itself as one of the most influential institutional forces in 
history. Legalized in AD 313 and adopted in AD 380, Christianity quickly har-
nessed reason as the handmaiden of faith, while simultaneously replacing the 
worldly outlook of the Greeks with the otherworldly outlook of the Kingdom of 
God. Among the most salient results, two in particular encapsulate the medieval 
mindset: (1) the supreme authority of the Church on all questions in all matters, 
and (2) an exhaustive emphasis on the love of God, including the love of all 
people for and through God, which is to say, in the name of God. This came at a 
great human cost manifested both as the restriction of reason to matters of faith 
and as the rejection of the classical love relevant to friendship, the latter a pref-
erential relationship between human beings as human beings, swiftly supplanted 
by a generic and derivative connection through the love of God.  
The modern period (2012a, 121–164), duly restoring both the role of reason 
and the spirit of humanism to their former glory, was unable to do the same for 
the place of friendship in moral theory. While effectively ending the hegemony 
of the church as the arbiter of truth, the burgeoning emphasis on rational in-
quiry, and its growing rate and scope of application, inspired philosophers to 
focus their efforts on grounding morality in reason, invariably at the cost of 
ignoring what it means to be a human being, that is, to be a rational agent with 
inherent human needs, which in part make up the necessary conditions of the 
good life. As rigorous deontological and consequentialist approaches set out to 
reconsider the first principle of morality with a view to articulating it in formal 
terms, something of the humanity was lost along with the role of friendship as a 
central moral value. The return to humanism was, at least in this way, partially 
eclipsed by the revival of reason. 
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The contemporary period (2012a, 165–196), essentially an extension of the 
modern period, did not, in the main, reject the defining characteristics of the 
modern period. In fact, it did just the opposite, assimilating those characteristics 
even more fully as part of the cultural fabric of the times. The scientific method 
continued to reign supreme and eventually redefined the role of philosophy, 
which being unable to compete with the emerging sciences, instead sought and 
developed ways to complement them. Yet none of these philosophical respons-
es, including pragmatism, existentialism, and logical positivism (and analytic 
philosophy in general), sought to redefine or reconstruct the grounds and dic-
tates of morality from a fresh perspective, nor therefore did they restore friend-
ship to its rightful place in moral deliberation. 
Mitias submits that thinkers in the medieval period were diverted by reli-
gious considerations, those in the modern period by philosophical considera-
tions, and those in the contemporary period by metaphilosophical ones. These 
deviations are what he calls cultural paradigm shifts, which themselves come 
with moral paradigm shifts. This terminology and the associated ideas make up 
the first chapter, devoted in its entirety to explicating the notion of paradigms, 
both cultural and moral, though the chapter itself is titled “The Concept of  
a Moral Paradigm.” A cultural paradigm is the set of shared beliefs, values, and 
behavior patterns collectively and completely delineating the cultural profile of 
a community, including its customs, morals, politics, economics, educational 
system, and religious orientation, among other things, all fully reflected in its 
art, music, literature, and philosophy (2012a, 7–32, especially 7–14). A moral 
paradigm is the moral component of the corresponding cultural paradigm 
(2012a, 18–22, 28–32), embodying the relevant community’s conception of the 
highest good, including the principal values and ideals that are either ingredients 
of that good or conditions of its realization. This is where friendship comes in, 
as it is a necessary condition for happiness, which, in turn, is the highest good, 
explicitly so for the Hellenic and Hellenistic cultures, and according to Mitias, 
at least implicitly so for everyone else, whether they realize it or not. 
The various aspects and constituents of cultural paradigms, including moral 
paradigms but also others, are so interdependent as to react together in response 
to internal developments as well as external influences. The process is not mi-
nutely and rigidly synchronized across all dimensions, but any development in 
one element reverberates throughout the cultural paradigm until the momentum 
either subsides on its own (in the event that it does not prove compelling) or 
restructures the whole. The task of moral philosophers is neither the slavish 
promotion of established values nor the culturally insensitive rationalization of 
ideal ones. The ethicist, according to Mitias, must tend to both properly, thereby 
examining, exposing, defending, and criticizing every aspect of the prevailing 
moral paradigm, while at the same pursuing the dictates of reason to their ra-
tional end. The ethicist is the champion of his or her moral paradigm but not  
a servant of it. The moral paradigm is a point of reference and inspiration, not 
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 a conceptual prison of sacrosanct parameters. The ethicist may and indeed must 
go beyond the moral paradigm, correcting it if necessary, wherever reason and 
new developments suggest a need for intervention. 
Mitias captures this dual obligation perfectly in his metaphorical assignment 
of a Janusian mind to the ethicist (2012a, 29, cf. 63–65, 149). This is precisely 
the problem in the medieval period, where the moral paradigm, along with the 
cultural, promoted faith to the level of a complement to reason, not displacing 
reason entirely but enslaving it effectively as a tool reserved for the elucidation 
of faith (though not for its justification, as faith never needed any justification, 
only commitment). The ethicist went along with this, submitting to assimilation 
in the new paradigm. And that same dereliction of duty sustained generations of 
moral philosophers complying with an otherworldly cultural and moral outlook 
as the growth of Christianity shifted the focus of attention from this world to the 
next, hence from humanity to divinity, from the natural to the transcendent, and 
from existential fulfillment to eternal salvation. As mentioned above, despite a 
recovery in the modern period, with reason restored to its previous prominence 
and humanism re-emerging as a shared value, friendship was absent from moral 
discourse as a central value in that period as well, and also from the next one, 
the contemporary period, excluding a recent revival of attention by ethicists. 
The final chapter of the book, titled “Friendship as an Ontological Need” 
(2012a, 197–216), is a dialectical instantiation of the hospital metaphor prefig-
uring it through the symbolic events surrounding Angelique, our angel in dis-
tress. The crux of the argument there is that friendship is a need we have as 
human beings for no other reason than that we are human beings. It is an exis-
tential and essential need. This is the sort of need that arises simply by virtue of 
the fact that we exist, which we cannot help but do in conformity with humanity 
as our essence. Our ontological status as human beings thus comes with friend-
ship as a basic need. That is what makes it a necessary condition of human ex-
cellence (arete), and ipso facto of human flourishing (eudaimonia), which, in 
turn, is the greatest good (summum bonum) and therefore the principle of dis-
tinction between right and wrong. And this is what, according to Mitias, makes 
friendship a central moral value, long neglected by ethicists and urgently to be 
restored by them to its rightful place in moral discourse. 
But what is that rightful place? Where exactly does friendship belong in 
moral discourse? Assuming that Mitias is right, what are we supposed to do to 
set things right? Given that the call is for the restoration of friendship as a cen-
tral moral value—not necessarily in our personal affairs, which may also need 
serious reconsideration, but specifically in ethical theory—we must figure out 
how to rehabilitate moral philosophy accordingly. That much is clear. We also 
know that the call is neither for more nor for better studies of friendship from  
a moral perspective in general. It is instead for a revival within the sphere  
of normative ethics in particular, preferably in a capacity where friendship as  
a moral value has some sort of impact on our conception of the difference  
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between good and bad, and right and wrong. That, too, is clear. What we need, 
if we are convinced, is implementation. Just how would this restoration project 
work? 
We have already seen that divine command theory, to begin with the original 
break with the common core of the moral paradigm in the Hellenic and Hellenis-
tic periods, is hostile to the notion of friendship as valuable in any way outside the 
love God already requires us to show in his name and through his will to every-
one. The preferential nature of the relationship in friendship is inconsistent with 
the love of humanity through the will of God, where any excess of devotion to  
a friend over and above what God already requires us to show others is as good as 
a heretical declaration that we as human beings have a say in this no less than 
God. How can we possibly acknowledge friendship as a central moral value in an 
ethical system grounded in divine command theory? This would make a good 
rhetorical question at this point, but it deserves and requires an actual answer. 
I submit that there is no way to introduce such a modification without un-
dermining the system. The incorporation of friendship as a central moral value 
would alter the nature of any divine command, where the word of God is both 
final and complete, neither allowing nor requiring revision. Moreover, it would 
also change the nature of friendship as a concept. To see why the latter is so, 
imagine that we are able to tweak the system so that the preferential nature of 
friendship is no longer inconsistent with God’s will, and is, in fact, commanded 
directly by God as an obligation to love and honor close personal friends over 
and above the standard amount and kind of love we owe everyone else. There 
might then seem to be ample room for friendship in divine command theory so 
long as God wants it that way. But this will not work, as it is antithetical to the 
concept. Being good to someone, namely to putative friends, merely to appease 
God, precludes friendship as the nature of the corresponding relationship, even 
if obedience to God’s command to be good as ordered were to count as moral 
behavior. There is no compulsory friendship. 
Divine command theory, then, would be a poor choice for the restoration 
project. Would secular alternatives fare any better? To continue with an obvious 
example, where might friendship as a moral value go in the categorical impera-
tive? Here is what I mean: What if we were to accept Mitias’s thesis regarding 
friendship, asking him to help us restore it as a central moral value in any for-
mulation of the categorical imperative? In other words, what if we were to ask 
Mitias to show us how to reformulate the categorical imperative to make room 
for friendship as a central moral value? His immediate reaction would, no 
doubt, be to ask why we are pursuing such a fruitless project. Suppose we were 
to respond that we find his position on friendship compelling and simply want 
to implement it in a normative ethical theory we find compelling as well. His 
next response would assuredly be that we do not understand his position on 
friendship, let alone finding it compelling, if we insist on implementing it in the 
categorical imperative. 
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This is not because he has arbitrarily rejected deontological ethics as a guide 
for sorting out moral problems or for leading a morally respectable life. It is 
because there is no room for friendship in any formulation of the categorical 
imperative. Consider the main one, the formula of universal law: “act only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law” (Ak. 4:421, cf. 4:402, original emphasis).14 Now try to 
incorporate friendship into that sentence. It can be done, of course, but the result 
would hardly be useful and would certainly look contrived: “act only in accord-
ance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be-
come a universal law, and, in addition, make sure you surround yourself with 
good friends, who are, being good, liable to facilitate your adherence to the first 
part of this imperative.” This is quite a stretch. Perhaps the gimmicky exhorta-
tion can be replaced with candor and clarity: “act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal 
law, always keeping in mind that friendship, no matter how irrelevant it may be 
to bring this up right now, is a central moral value.” This one is straightforward, 
by any measure, but it is also monstrous. Neither one works. Nor will anything 
else. There is simply no meaningful way to append the concept of friendship to 
a statement of the categorical imperative. 
The problem is not peculiar to this particular formulation. Consider the for-
mula of the end-in-itself: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means” (Ak. 4:429, original emphasis). Here, too, any interpolation 
to acknowledge the value of friendship would be disruptive: “So act that you 
use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always 
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means, sparing no effort to treat 
your close personal friends especially well, because friendship is a central moral 
value.” Unlike the previous attempts, the addition here may appear to be the-
matically relevant to the original, given the common emphasis on conduct to-
ward others, but it actually detracts from what is said in the original without 
adding anything of significance, as it seeks to introduce and regulate a privi-
leged relationship, namely friendship, in a universal directive on how to act 
toward everyone. The preferential demands of one contradicts the egalitarian 
restrictions of the other. As a result, this experiment works no better than the 
operations considered in the first formulation. And the same outcome awaits 
any other attempt with any other formulation. We need not repeat the exercise 
for each one, especially since Kant himself announces that there is only one 
categorical imperative, all variations being merely different formulations of the 
same principle (Ak. 4:436, cf. 4:436–440). 
————————— 
14 Page references to Kant are to the Akademie edition of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sit-
ten (1785). Quotations are from the translation by Mary Gregor (1997), always including italiciza-
tion where present, though never introducing it otherwise. 
 Angelique: An Angel in Distress, Morality in Crisis   29 
The reason that there is no meaningful room for invoking the concept of 
friendship in any of its formulations is that the categorical imperative is the 
culmination of Kant’s initiative, as articulated in the preface to his Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, to seek out and establish the supreme principle of 
morality through pure reason, that is, completely independently of any input 
through the benefit of experience (Ak. 4:391–392). This automatically excludes 
friendship, which is a patently existential phenomenon, at least because it is 
a relationship, which then calls for interaction, and therefore experience. Impos-
sible to establish a priori, and inseparable from experience, particularly from 
experience as a human being, friendship cannot be incorporated into the su-
preme principle of morality from Kant’s perspective. 
A tempting objection may be that the point is not actually to mention friend-
ship right there in the categorical imperative, nor to do so in any other candidate 
for the supreme principle of morality, but simply to acknowledge friendship as  
a central moral value somewhere in the corresponding normative ethical plat-
form. The objection would, if valid, require a revision of our original appeal to 
Mitias, changing it from a request for assistance in reformulating the categorical 
imperative to account for friendship, to a request for assistance in doing the 
same thing in the broader ethical theory without necessarily modifying the cate-
gorical imperative itself. There are two problems with that strategy. First, the 
nature of the broader revision suggested is nebulous, with little hope of clarifi-
cation toward a meaningful request, to say nothing of the possibility of success-
ful implementation. Attempting to make room in the categorical imperative for 
mentioning friendship in passing may be a fool’s errand, but the fool there at 
least has the benefit of a clear goal. Attempting to make room in deontological 
ethics for recognizing friendship as a central moral value is not even meaningful 
enough to be foolish.15 Second, even if friendship as a central moral value could 
somehow be incorporated into Kant’s ethics, it would very likely still be open to 
the original charge of neglect, given that the categorical imperative dominates 
Kant’s moral theory, with everything else, if there is anything left at all, remain-
ing obscured by the oppressive ubiquity of his supreme principle of morality, 
particularly where normative ethics is concerned. Accordingly, while ending 
and reversing the neglect of friendship in moral philosophy requires its inclu-
sion as a central moral value in ethical theory, this is out of the question in 
Kant’s ethics, simply because the central spot there is reserved for the categori-
————————— 
15 One critic has warned me that this sounds dismissive. It is not meant to be. To clarify, all I 
am saying is that it is not enough to assert that deontological ethics, broadly construed, might be 
able to accommodate friendship as a central moral value even where the categorical imperative as 
its first principle cannot. This may well be true. But it may just as well be false. The bare 
assertion is an empty declaration that lacks not just evidence but meaning and essence as well. 
One must elucidate and illustrate the presumed possibility, so that we can see at least what it 
entails, if not also whether it is real, just as I have done in ruling out the same possibility in the 
case of the categorical imperative. 
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cal imperative. Any other spot, even if one could be claimed for friendship, 
would not be central, nor anywhere near the center, and would therefore not 
count as the acknowledgment of friendship as a central moral value. 
This does not mean that friendship is incompatible with deontological ethics. 
It does not mean, for example, that the categorical imperative is against having 
friends, instead classifying friendship as a morally unacceptable pursuit. But it 
does mean that deontological ethics has no use for friendship. It can reach all 
the conclusions it needs to reach without any help from friendship as a moral 
value. Friendship is simply irrelevant. 
What about other normative ethical theories? Is friendship irrelevant every-
where? While going through the whole of normative ethics may not be a practi-
cal endeavor within the space of a single article, it might still be useful to take  
a look at consequentialism, at least briefly, through its most popular version, 
utilitarianism. Consider the classical rendition of the principle of utility, avoid-
ing variations and distinctions that may be important in themselves but extrane-
ous here (such as act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism, 
negative utilitarianism, and so on): Actions are right insofar as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong insofar as they tend to do the opposite, where happi-
ness is defined as pleasure and the absence of pain.16 As with the categorical 
imperative, any interpolation here to introduce the concept of friendship will be 
somewhat messy: Actions are right insofar as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong insofar as they tend to do the opposite, where happiness is defined as 
pleasure and the absence of pain, a net pleasurable balance in which is facilitat-
ed, among other things, by friendship, which is, in fact, both a means to happi-
ness and a part of happiness, thus confirming its status as a central moral value 
in our lives. Unlike the modifications to the categorical imperative, however, 
this interpolation in the principle of utility does not seem entirely out of place. 
Notwithstanding the clutter, the friendly amendment, so to speak, is at least 
consistent with the original principle. 
This is substantiated to a certain degree, perhaps to a convincing degree, in 
Mill’s acknowledgment that happiness has various ingredients that are desired 
————————— 
16 This formulation of the principle of utility, paraphrasing Bentham and Mill together, is 
consistent with the spirit of both. While the wording is a bit closer to Mill, the meaning is no 
further from Bentham. Bentham’s version is in the second section (= second numbered paragraph) 
of the first chapter of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: “By the 
principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action 
whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the 
happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to 
promote or to oppose that happiness” (Bentham, 1789, 2; Collected Works, 1970, 11–12). Mill’s 
version is in the second paragraph of the second chapter of Utilitarianism: “The creed which 
accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce 
the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure” (Mill, 1861, 394; Collected Works, 1969, 210). 
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and desirable for their own sakes albeit as parts of happiness.17 Further corrobo-
ration is available in his initiative to place a premium on the quality of pleas-
ures, as opposed to focusing solely on the quantity, thereby carving out room 
for traditional values, which can reasonably be expected to include friendship.18 
While Mill does not provide an itemized list of such values, he does try to dis-
tance himself from the radical fungibility of pleasures in Bentham, who consid-
ers the game of push-pin as valuable as the art of poetry so long as they both 
provide the same amount of pleasure.19 This would seem to suggest that there is 
room in utilitarianism, at least in Mill’s version, to recognize friendship as  
a moral value in its own right. 
Hence, even if the principle of utility itself, because it is the first principle of 
morality, is not an appropriate or convenient place to acknowledge the value of 
friendship, the ethical system founded on it may be open to that possibility. This 
is one reason I have refrained from claiming that the expectations of Mitias can 
be met only through virtue ethics, settling instead for the weaker claim that they 
can be met best through virtue ethics.20 At the very least, neither Bentham nor 
Mill ignores empirical considerations, whereas ignoring them is exactly what 
Kant sets out to do in fulfillment of his overarching methodological constraint. 
That is also why Mitias himself is more critical of deontological ethics than he 
is of utilitarian ethics. He may resist utilitarian calculation, but he resents deon-
tological deliberation. 
————————— 
17 The relevant passage is in the fifth paragraph of the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, where 
Mill submits that the “ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in 
itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate,” adding that these ingredients 
“are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end” 
(Mill 1861, 531; Collected Works 1969, 235). 
18 Mill devotes a total of eight paragraphs, immediately following the first two paragraphs of 
the second chapter of Utilitarianism (Mill, 1861, 395–398; Collected Works, 1969, 210–214), to 
the articulation and establishment of a qualitative distinction between higher and lower pleasures. 
His attempt, still controversial, is best remembered for a colorful comparison: “It is better to be  
a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their 
own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides” (Mill, 1861, 396; 
Collected Works, 1969, 212). 
19 Bentham expresses his indifference, to the type of pleasure in any given amount of it, in the 
first chapter of the third book of The Rationale of Reward: “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin 
is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish 
more pleasure, it is more valuable than either” (Bentham, 1825, 206). While Mill takes up 
Bentham’s push-pin analogy in an anonymous review (Mill, 1838, 504; Collected Works, 1969, 
113), he later avoids any reference to it in Utilitarianism, where he distances himself from the 
commensurability of pleasures, without explicitly contradicting Bentham, evidently because, at 
that point, their common understanding requires greater emphasis than their differences, owing to 
the nature of the work as an attempt at explaining, defending, and promoting utilitarianism. 
20 Another reason is that I have not surveyed the full spectrum of normative ethical theories, 
limiting myself to a few that have traditionally received the most attention. The same logic would 
seem to caution against making even the weaker claim I have made, but the evidence is 
compelling, as Mitias himself demonstrates in his third chapter (2012a, 61–86). 
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A nagging problem with utilitarianism, however, is that no room that might 
conceivably be staked out for friendship as a moral value can be a “central” 
position as urged by Mitias. Friendship can at best be counted among the gener-
ic “means to” or “parts of” happiness mulled over by Mill in one fell swoop 
without itemization, the whole kit and caboodle being designated “ingredients 
of happiness,” evidently in anticipation of potential protests that his exclusive 
focus on happiness may be leaving out other morally relevant considerations. 
While that is more than anything Kant would ever concede, it still does not 
seem enough. Assenting to friendship as a good, especially by implication and 
without specification, is a far cry from embracing it as a good. Even affirming 
friendship as a moral value is not the same as acknowledging its place as a cen-
tral moral value to be reckoned with as a matter of course in moral discourse. 
Moreover, the very essence of the hedonic calculus, despite Mill’s emphasis 
on the quality of pleasures, seems antithetical to the spirit of the call Mitias is 
making for the restoration of friendship as a central moral value. The give-and-
take of friendship is a process grounded in love, where there are no ledgers of 
who owes whom a favor, the balance being forever fluid and never questioned. 
The process of elimination points to virtue ethics. That is not enough just yet 
to confirm that virtue ethics is the best platform for friendship as a central moral 
value. We have considered only a few alternatives, too few to entrust the matter 
entirely to a process of elimination. But the reason that the process of elimina-
tion, incomplete as it is, persistently favors virtue ethics is that the elimination 
of virtue ethics is out of the question since it is the origin of the value we are 
trying to recover. Virtue ethics promises a perfect fit for the restoration project 
simply because that is where friendship was originally acknowledged as a cen-
tral moral value, disappearing rather “abruptly,” according to Mitias (2012a, 
87–88), after which the ethical system itself was replaced with successive sub-
stitutes, starting with divine command theory. 
Although divine command theory eventually lost its monopoly as the ulti-
mate source of moral guidance, explanation, and justification, emerging alterna-
tives were alternatives to virtue ethics as well. Deontological ethics and utilitar-
ian ethics, along with any number of other approaches, were inspired by the 
success of the scientific method, whereby reason and observation reclaimed 
their role from divine revelation as reliable tools for the acquisition of 
knowledge. Their aims and methods were radically different from both virtue 
ethics and theological ethics. What they neglected was not friendship in particu-
lar but the virtues in general.21 More accurately, they did not neglect the virtues 
————————— 
21 Everything Mitias says about friendship holds for anything that is intrinsically valuable, 
especially from a moral perspective. The problem with the ethical theories he criticizes is not 
simply that they neglect friendship, or any other value in particular, but that they neglect what it 
means to be human. None of the virtues taken up by Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, for example, is 
under consideration as a central moral value in any theory Mitias discusses in the book. Recall 
where temperance (sōphrosynē) is mentioned in the categorical imperative, or where courage 
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but abandoned the process of starting with the virtues as given, attempting in-
stead to discover a first principle on which to ground a moral system. This is 
largely why friendship, having once lost its place as a central moral value, never 
recovered it. Many of the moral theories springing up in the modern period were 
not formulated in a way amenable to its recovery. 
Virtue ethics itself eventually recovered—though perhaps not exactly as 
formulated by Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle—but friendship as a central moral 
value never did. That is why Mitias finds it “really surprising” (2012a, 4) that 
friendship is still missing from recent and current scholarship in virtue ethics. 
While he acknowledges that friendship is now receiving some attention as a 
moral concept, and hence is not altogether absent from ethical discourse, he 
notes that it is still not recognized as a central moral value. The primary reason 
friendship never recovered, while virtue ethics did, is that the momentous dis-
placement of the Greek philia by the Christian agape was never reversed in 
moral theory (2012a, 206–211), because the switch was never perceived as an 
obstacle to progress in ethical theory. Love is love, after all, and there is no 
reason to suspect one kind as standing in the way of another, even when it does. 
Mitias urges theologians to make room for friendship as a central moral val-
ue, which he insists is consistent with both the love of God and the love God 
wants us to show one another. As a matter of fact, the rise of Christian morality 
in the medieval moral paradigm was not so much a substitute for virtue ethics as 
it was a continuation of it with a different set of virtues. Virtue ethics and theo-
logical ethics are not grounded in two different methodologies, with the first 
abandoned for the second, but in two different value systems, with a single meth-
odology recalibrated to accommodate new values, specifically those emerging 
through the paradigm shift effected by the growing popularity of Christianity. 
Nevertheless, the plea Mitias makes for theologians and adherents alike to 
acknowledge the inherent room in religion for friendship is not an endorsement 
of theological ethics but a suggestion for its rehabilitation. There is no room in 
Mitias for what has no room in the Euthyphro: “Is the pious being loved by the 
gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?” (10a). 
Recall the immediate response of Euthyphro: “I don’t know what you mean, 
Socrates” (10a). Euthyphro is neither ignorant nor obtuse. The reason that he 
does not know what is meant is that he does not see how the value of anything 
dear to the gods could possibly require any further explanation in regard to the 
source of that value. He sees no difference between the alternatives presented, 
which collapse into the same explanation, just as the major monotheistic reli-
                                                                                                                                              
(andreia) is invoked in the principle of utility: Nowhere. The classical virtues, and indeed all 
moral values, stand or fall together, except in cases where one of them is declared supreme, 
whether as being more important than the rest or as subsuming all the rest as conditions or 
constituents. Either they are all reasonably and usefully close to the center of attention in moral 
discourse, or they all disappear together as morality itself is pursued from a different angle where 
virtue is at best a result and not an input. 
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gions, including Christianity, acknowledge no difference between moral expla-
nation and divine command (or divine revelation) and none again between be-
ing good and doing God’s bidding. 
Secular theories are invariably sensitive to that difference, but most of the 
leading ones are not particularly sensitive to the classical virtues, or to tradition-
al values in general, be it friendship or anything else, none of which is rejected, 
though none ever seems to come up either. It is only natural that restoring 
friendship as a central moral value should best be accomplished within virtue 
ethics, not only because that is where it was recognized before it became ne-
glected, but also because the recognition of such values, including friendship, 
but also others, is the basic operating mechanism of the theory. To borrow  
a mode of expression relished by Mitias: “I do not exaggerate when I say” that 
friendship as a central moral value can best be accommodated in virtue ethics, 
because friendship is a basic human need, and because virtue ethics provides the 
greatest insight into what it means to be a human being, namely a bundle of 
potentiality to be actualized in reference to qualities representative of human 
excellence. And again in the style of Mitias: “I would not be far amiss” in sug-
gesting that Mitias himself is pleading for a return to virtue ethics through his 
plea for the restoration of friendship to its rightful place as a central moral value 
in ethical theory. 
 
 
4. CRITICAL RECEPTION 
 
The critical reception of Mitias on friendship consists so far entirely of book 
reviews. I am aware of four such treatments to date. Many of their expository 
highlights and several of their critical insights overlap with some of what I have 
already covered here. There is no point in revisiting all of it with each critic, but 
going through the strongest objection of each may help highlight disagreements 
on matters that are of importance to the community of scholars addressed by 
Mitias. Given that he is appealing primarily to professional ethicists in his call 
to restore friendship as a central moral value to its rightful place in moral dis-
course, a mutual understanding of significant differences between the two  
parties, preferably with some notion of how they might be resolved, is of the 
utmost importance to both. 
 
4.1. Ruth Abbey: Methodology 
 
Abbey (2013) does not challenge Mitias on philosophical grounds. That is to 
say, she does not object, in principle, to the plea Mitias is making in regard to 
friendship. She does not endorse it either. She instead offers two objections 
regarding methodology: first, that Mitias does not engage adequately with the 
literature; second, that he does not clarify what he means by friendship. She also 
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makes a couple of substantive points, but those are not objections to the thesis 
itself, just to the logic of certain moves in the process of defending that thesis. 
They are best taken up after addressing methodological concerns, since it is 
difficult to sort out possible errors in reasoning without agreement on how the 
reasoning proceeds. 
The first objection regarding methodology, implying either ignorance or ne-
glect of the relevant literature, is repeated by another reviewer, Sandra Lynch 
(2014, 786), which adds to the gravity of the charge, at least as a perceived 
weakness, and thus merits an apology in the classical sense. The objection is 
justified if the standard scholarly requirement to engage with the relevant litera-
ture is not satisfied by relentless references to Aristotle, Bacon, Bentham, Cice-
ro, Descartes, Dewey, Epicurus, Hegel, Heraclitus, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, 
Locke, Marcus Aurelius, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Plato, Pythagoras, Rousseau, 
Socrates, and Spinoza, among others. One wonders whether a valid point cannot 
be made without expanding on what is surely a fairly representative list of ref-
erences to begin with. It is, no doubt, a crime against scholarship to write about 
any one of these philosophers without dealing with the secondary literature on 
them, and in Aristotle’s case, without consulting the tertiary literature on the 
secondary literature. Yet it is not altogether fair to look for these extra layers 
where the work in question is not on one of these philosophers but on all of 
them, or rather on something that concerns all of them. 
The main methodological tool Mitias uses here is nothing short of a survey 
of the history of western civilization, including not just its philosophy but also 
its art, literature, and science. While he does not deal directly with the current 
state of scholarship on Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and so on, that is only because 
he does not aim to establish a novel interpretation of their philosophy or seek to 
challenge any of the ones currently in favor. His otherwise meticulously docu-
mented and sweeping study of western culture brings out points that are not in 
contention but neglected. Additional citations from current literature, whether 
on western civilization in general or on friendship in particular, would certainly 
not have compromised anything accomplished by the initiative, but neither does 
the present absence of a pedantic pretension to exhaustive coverage of the 
scholarship, especially since none of it deals at any length with the thesis Mitias 
presents and defends. 
Neither Abbey (2013) nor Lynch (2014) adduces any examples of recent 
scholarship ignored by Mitias yet relevant to his thesis. Lynch seems to think 
she does in bringing up the relatively recent identification of a gap in philosoph-
ical work on friendship “between the writings of Emerson [1841] and the con-
temporary work of Telfer [1970]” (Pakaluk 1991, vii, quoted by Lynch 2014, 
786). The period indicated is, as Lynch rightly notes, considerably shorter than 
the sixteen hundred years in Mitias. Yet the apparent discrepancy is not relevant 
to his thesis. Nor is there any actual discrepancy. The period in Mitias does not 
cover the absence of friendship from all scholarly discussion, not even from all 
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philosophical discussion. It only concerns the absence of friendship as a central 
moral value from ethical theory, the specificity of which is emphasized 
throughout his book. Mitias even acknowledges up front an abundance of publi-
cations on friendship, including philosophical ones that do not contradict his 
thesis of its absence as a central moral value from moral discourse: 
 
“The assertion that theorizing on friendship as a central moral value has been 
absent from the major philosophical systems of the past sixteen hundred 
years does not at all imply the absence of writings on friendship. On the con-
trary, philosophers, theologians, and essayists have left a large number of 
discussions, articles, essays, and even books on friendship. Many of these 
writings are interesting, insightful, and instructive, but they do not treat it as 
a central moral value and they do not view it as a condition of the good life” 
(Mitias 2012a, 2). 
 
The second objection regarding methodology challenges the clarity of what 
Mitias means by friendship: “it is unclear what friendship really is” (Abbey 
2013, 90, original emphasis). This is a standard methodological complaint da-
ting at least as far back as Plato. But even Plato’s Socrates was in the habit of 
hounding interlocutors for a precise definition only when the context called for 
it, that is, only when interlocutors insisted on discussing something which they 
did not understand well enough to reach accurate or meaningful conclusions. 
Recall how Socrates presses Meno for a definition of virtue before addressing 
whether or not virtue is teachable (Meno), whereas he does not pester Simmias 
or Cebes for a definition of the soul before moving on to a series of arguments 
on the immortality of the soul (Phaedo). The nature of what Mitias is trying to 
accomplish places his initiative closer to the case of the Phaedo than to that of 
the Meno. He is not claiming that we have so far misunderstood what friendship 
is. On the contrary, he is telling us that, because we all know very well what 
friendship is, he is astonished that we have lost sight of how valuable it is, as 
evidenced by its disappearance from moral discourse. 
More importantly, Mitias does, in fact, offer a core conception of friendship, 
which he both invokes and explicates throughout the book. Not only does he 
define friendship himself (e.g., 2012a, 1–2) but he tells us how several of the 
most relevant philosophers define it as well (e.g., Aristotle in pages 66–70, Cic-
ero in pages 75–77, 77–82). Curiously, while Abbey acknowledges his attempt 
at definition, she reduces it to a matter of looking it up in the dictionary: “The 
last chapter offers a definition from the Webster New College Dictionary (p. 
205)” (2013, 90). This is true. The last chapter does quote that dictionary. But 
the chapters before that do a whole lot more which Abbey conveniently ignores 
in presenting Mitias as giving us no better an account of friendship than we may 
find in the dictionary. 
The truth of the matter is that Mitias goes far beyond a lexical definition of 
friendship far sooner than Abbey has him quoting the dictionary. He certainly 
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does not wait until the last chapter. He does not even wait until the end of the 
first chapter. In the first couple of pages alone, he tells us that “friendship is  
a mode, or type, of human experience” manifested as “a type of behavior” in  
“a profoundly important relation” that is “rooted in the depth of our humanity as 
a basic need,” adding that this experience is “a moral type of experience,” and 
that, “as such, it implies a moral value,” which, in turn, makes it “an essential 
ingredient, and therefore a condition, of the moral life” (Mitias, 2012a, 1–2). 
It is only later that Mitias, having already established the nature of the con-
cept, offers an excursion into the etymology of the word, both giving and cri-
tiquing the lexical definition in the dictionary mentioned (2012a, 205 ff.). He 
then goes on to consider its Old English and Germanic roots, using that as  
a segue into a discussion of philia (2012a, 206–211). It is especially unfair to 
accuse Mitias of not defining friendship when he dedicates several sections of 
the third chapter to exploring what friendship is, even titling one of those sec-
tions “What is Friendship?” (2012a, 77–82). While that particular section is an 
exposition and exploration of Cicero’s perspective, the author’s open approval 
of that perspective makes it his own as well. 
As for Abbey’s (2013, 90) reservations regarding the logic of the argument, 
they seem to be facilitated by the same methodological gap she sees in Mitias 
between definition (or clarification) and argumentation. Her first substantive 
point is as follows: “Humans are social creatures and from this Mitias jumps to 
proclaiming our need for friendship” (2013, 90). The reason her substantive 
remark on reasoning recalls her methodological one on definition is that the 
“jump” Abbey mentions is a jump only if one takes Mitias to leave readers with 
a definition of friendship straight from the dictionary, moving immediately af-
terwards, without any further development or argument, to an elaborate concep-
tion where friendship appears at the end as nothing like what was said at the 
beginning. This is to ignore a great deal of explanation and argumentation in 
between. 
Abbey’s point is contradicted by another reviewer, Kristina Gehrman (2014), 
who also happens to disagree with Mitias but with Abbey as well. Gehrman 
accepts the move from creatures who are social to creatures who need friend-
ship, while objecting that this establishes only that friendship is a basic human 
need and not that it is a moral one, or in her own words, not that “friendship as  
a moral relation” (her emphasis) is “a basic human need” (2014, 544). Mitias 
would agree with this, as he never argues that “friendship as a moral relation” is 
a basic human need, just that friendship is a basic human need and that friend-
ship is a moral relation. The combination Gehrman attributes to Mitias is not  
a single inference Mitias makes from the simple observation that humans are 
social creatures. 
Abbey’s second substantive point is that Mitias “begs the question of how 
the human is construed” where he announces that “no matter what categories of 
people it unites, ‘philia is a human relation’ (p. 206, emphases original)” (2013, 
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90). This is not far from the logic of the alleged “jump” in the first substantive 
point. Just how does it beg the question of human nature to say that friendship is 
a human relation? It is not even an argument. It is merely an observation sub-
mitted for approval. One may reject the observation, preferably while correcting 
it, but construing it as begging the question is both captious and hyperbolic, 
especially since we all know that it is, in fact, not just true but obviously true.22 
The alternative is that friendship is not a human relation, which means either 
that it is not a relation at all or that it is a relation but not between humans. If 
Abbey rejects the original observation, she is committed to one of the patently 
false alternatives. If she rejects both alternatives, she must accept the original 
observation.23 
 
4.2. Kristina Gehrman: Pluralism 
 
Gehrman (2014) is the most constructive of the commentators reacting so far 
to Mitias on friendship. Her main concern is with a pluralism she observes in 
the contemporary cultural paradigm, which she then submits as differing in  
a potentially important way from the modern cultural paradigm, thus contradict-
ing Mitias’s position that these two paradigms are essentially the same, with one 
being a smooth continuation of the other: “modern ‘beliefs and values remain, 
so far as I know, the basis of the contemporary cultural paradigm’ and ‘the 
modern moral paradigm remains the framework within which moral analysis of 
any kind is done, directly or indirectly, by both the normative and the metaethi-
cal philosophers’” (Mitias, 2012a, 182, quoted by Gehrman, 2014, 545). Gehr-
man maintains that this description applies reasonably well to academic philos-
ophers operating in the twentieth century but not to ordinary people shaped by 
contemporary western culture: “I especially doubt it is true of today’s under-
graduate students, who are mostly in the grip of a pluralism so confounding that 
they really do not know whether it is ever justified for a person to have moral 
convictions and act on them” (Gehrman, 2014, 545). 
Gehrman’s objection is both relevant and pressing. It presents a challenge 
that Mitias must confront in his critical survey of cultural and moral paradigms. 
The challenge, specifically, is this: “if pluralism is a deep feature of the con-
temporary moral paradigm, as I believe it is, then more must be said to establish 
————————— 
22 There may be exceptions, including but not limited to sociopaths who need no friends, but 
statistical outliers hardly undermine established patterns in human nature. 
23 Note that Abbey is not accusing Mitias of restricting friendship to human beings, and thereby 
of ignoring the possibility of friendship among other creatures, whether terrestrial or alien. Mitias 
never rules out such prospects. And Abbey never says he does. But even if he did, and she said he 
did, he would not be begging the question of “how the human is construed,” since his error would 
then be about how all other creatures are construed. Hence, what Abbey objects to as begging the 
question of human nature is not that friendship is exclusive to human beings but that it is essential 
to human beings. Yet everything in our experience shows that it is indeed essential to human 
beings. Pointing that out is not begging the question. 
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Mitias’s claim that friendship must be treated as a central moral value by con-
temporary moral theorists simply in virtue of the moral paradigm in which they 
operate” (Gehrman, 2014, 545). Indeed, the contemporary paradigm cannot be 
both a smooth continuation of the modern one in every relevant way and signif-
icantly different from it in any relevant way. Either Mitias is right or Gehrman 
is right but not both. Nor can both be wrong. 
The question itself, however, particularly if the point is to come up with  
a definitive answer, belongs somewhere in the social sciences rather than any-
where in the humanities. Both Mitias and Gehrman seem, on the whole, to be 
reporting their own impressions formulated through their personal and profes-
sional experiences fortified with scholarship in philosophy. But ascertaining 
what is really going on in contemporary culture in regard to the paradigmatic 
features in question, especially where scientific precision is required, seems to 
be a task better suited for sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and social psy-
chologists, to invoke just a few areas better equipped to settle the question than 
is philosophy. 
That said, scientific precision is not a necessary condition of disagreement 
on the matter. Not every social phenomenon or cultural trend requires confirma-
tion by a social scientist. Some are obvious, perhaps not in every detail but suf-
ficiently so in essentials. As a colleague of both Gehrman and Mitias, and as an 
observer at least as unqualified as they are to bring any scientific precision to 
bear on the matter, I find myself in agreement with both: There does seem to be 
a strong continuity between the modern and contemporary paradigms, just as 
Mitias proposes, and there does seem to be a broadly generalized subscription to 
pluralism in the latter that was lacking in the former, just as Gehrman observes. 
What makes only one of them right or wrong is whether the pluralism  
contradicts the continuity. This, in turn, depends on whether the continuity is 
supposed to be categorical. It is not. If it were, it would not be continuity but 
identity. I doubt very much that Mitias would oppose Gehrman on pluralism as 
a real phenomenon with a prominent role in shaping the contemporary cultural 
paradigm and consequently also the corresponding moral paradigm. He would 
not only concede the point, I suspect with gratitude, but also seek to join forces 
with Gehrman to come up with a strategy to overcome the obstacles such plural-
ism presents to the recognition of the constituents of a good life. 
While Mitias indeed calls upon ethicists to pay attention to their respective 
cultural and moral paradigms, he calls upon them just as urgently to rock the 
boat where the masses need help in actualizing their full potential as human 
beings: 
 
“Any attempt to formulate such a principle [‘a normative principle of moral 
evaluation’] without grounding it in the community’s actual, living moral 
sense would constitute a flight into sentimental idealism or sentimental utili-
tarianism, hence rendering the principle irrelevant to the life of the commu-
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nity; and any attempt to formulate this principle without regard to the actual 
possibilities potential in the moral vision and aspirations of the community 
with an eye on social reform and organization would constitute a surrender 
to a stagnant moral status quo, hence reducing the principle to a descriptive, 
scientific statement of the community’s sense of moral value or way of be-
having morally” (Mitias, 2012a, 29). 
 
This is what Mitias refers to as the “Janusian mind” of the moral philosopher 
(2012a, 29, cf. 63–65, 149), discussed above in connection with the medieval 
period in the course of the philosophical appraisal in section three. What this 
means in the context of pluralism is that the ethicist must respect the pluralistic 
mindset while articulating normative principles with a view to exposing the 
constituents of the good life in a way that even pluralists can recognize. Gehr-
man herself obviously agrees with this as she brings pluralism to our attention 
not as a universal truth in metaethics or normative ethics but as a cultural phe-
nomenon, ostensibly one embraced largely by millennials. She not only agrees 
with this but identifies it as a challenge to be met in her own professional capac-
ity as a philosopher and teacher, particularly of ethics: “That makes the chal-
lenge of pluralism, in my view, one of the most fundamental challenges of the 
contemporary moral period. It is certainly one of the most basic and interesting 
challenges of teaching ethics” (Gehrman, 2014, 545). 
As difficult as it is to negotiate the line between pluralism and relativism, 
especially with undergraduates who may confuse respect for the beliefs of oth-
ers with assent to the truth of those beliefs, and thereby with acknowledgment 
of the relativity of all beliefs, friendship is probably not among the most diffi-
cult concepts to sort out in that regard. And this is precisely how Gehrman con-
cludes her commentary on Mitias: 
 
“I never met an undergraduate who came into the classroom already con-
cerned about internal versus external reasons, or worried about whether 
ought implies can, even if many of them can be brought to care about these 
things. But friendship—friendship is something they are intimately acquaint-
ed with; something they already care about deeply. The deep human value of 
good relationships is something they have a live appreciation for. This text 
[Friendship: A Central Moral Value] connects something that every student 
knows and cares about with the full rich history of the Western philosophical 
tradition” (Gehrman, 2014, 546). 
 
Even pluralists and relativists, after all, have friends. And if they have 
friends, they are themselves friends (to someone or other). This being so, not 
only do they have friends and are themselves friends but they also evidently 
appreciate the value of such relationships. The remaining task, then, is to im-
press upon them, if they do not yet see it, that the value they already recognize 
in friendship is a moral value. 
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4.3. Sandra Lynch: Consistency 
Sandra Lynch (2014) is, like Mitias, a prominent scholar on friendship. Had 
Mitias not limited himself largely to the classics, instead engaging more with 
recent scholarship, he would have done well to consult the work of Lynch.24 She 
says so herself: “Other contemporary commentators with whom Mitias might 
have engaged are Mark Vernon, Lorraine Smith Pangle, and myself” (Lynch 
2014, 786). This is a legitimate claim. It is at least as legitimate as the compe-
tency asserted in the hospital metaphor where Angelique’s nurse campaigns for 
formal acknowledgment of a job well done (cf. section two above). The nurse’s 
reaction is Mitias’s reminder why our angels remain in distress, our morality in 
crisis, our philosophy off course. Let Lynch’s reaction be mine. 
This is not to suggest that recommending one’s own work is a transgression 
of morality but that preoccupation with oneself is a reflection of why we have 
not, with each of us admiring and promoting our own value, been entirely suc-
cessful in recognizing it in others. Meanwhile, a morality in crisis and a philo-
sophical enterprise off course await cooperative intervention. 
Lynch does, to be fair, mention quite a few names other than her own, eleven 
in all, but when the list ends with hers, the other ten look like a means to that 
end. Especially suspicious in that regard is the special effort to dig up eight of 
those names from the bibliography of a book (Pakaluk 1991) already cited by 
Mitias (2012a, 217, note 1), just to admonish him for neglecting the eight he left 
out (Lynch 2014, 786). Note that this is not a failure by Mitias to discuss items 
in his own bibliography but a failure by him to discuss those in someone else’s 
bibliography. We would be hard pressed to get anything done if we had to dis-
cuss every work cited by every work cited by us. And even if we somehow suc-
ceeded in covering all of that, we would forever remain open to comparable 
charges regarding further references in a never-ending chain of entries: those in 
the bibliographies of the entries in the bibliographies of the entries in our own 
bibliography, ad infinitum. 
Aside from her misdirected reaction to his bibliography, Lynch is the most 
formidable of Mitias’s critics. This is because her main objection, if valid, is the 
most damaging. Yet I do not believe it is valid. Lynch charges Mitias with 
a mutual inconsistency in his conceptions of friendship and slavery as cultural 
phenomena, which she adds is indicative of the strategy of the book to compen-
sate for internal contradictions through selective emphasis. There are two as-
pects to this charge. The first is the inconsistency of being a universalist on the 
moral value of friendship as a human relation while remaining a relativist on the 
moral status of slavery as a social institution: 
————————— 
24 Mitias would probably still not have found a suitable occasion to cite Lynch, however, as her 
work on friendship does not affirm or contradict his thesis concerning the longstanding neglect of 
friendship as a central moral value in ethical theory. 
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“In the context of Mitias’ argument for the superiority of cultural paradigms 
which recognise the moral worth of friendship, the argument for the relativi-
ty of the justice of slavery appears contradictory and undermines his claim 
that the medieval, modern, and contemporary paradigms are inferior because 
they fail to recognise friendship as a central moral value” (Lynch, 2014, 
787). 
 
The second is the selective emphasis concealing any and all such inconsist-
encies, as in the questionable room allegedly created thereby to advocate friend-
ship but not slavery, both permanent fixtures of Greek life (Hellenic and Hellen-
istic): 
 
“Mitias’ argument is unconvincing because of its commitment to the totalis-
ing narrative noted above, a narrative which assigns different moral visions 
to competing cultural paradigms, criticising those which on Mitias’ view fail 
to recognise friendship as a central moral value in human life” (Lynch, 2014, 
787). 
 
Regarding the first aspect of the charge, the response is that Mitias never 
claims the morality of slavery to be a relative matter. To put it in Lynch’s terms, 
Mitias himself has no “argument for the relativity of the justice of slavery” 
(Lynch, 2014, 787). Here is what Mitias says: 
 
“A certain action in our society may seem to us unjust, but in a different so-
ciety the same action may seem just to the members of that society. For ex-
ample, in our society it is unjust to enslave human beings, but in ancient 
Greece, indeed in most of the ancient world, it was just to enslave human be-
ings. Slavery was viewed as a natural human practice. Thus it is reasonable 
to say that moral values define the domain of moral action, or behavior. 
They, moreover, constitute the ‘morality’ of a society, or a culture” (Mitias, 
2012a, 19). 
 
And here is how Lynch interprets it: “The view which Mitias expresses here 
is an example of moral relativism” (2014, 787). It is not. It is an example of 
cultural relativism about morality, which then lends credence to its nomination 
as descriptive moral relativism but not to its classification either as normative 
moral relativism or as metaethical moral relativism. These are defining distinc-
tions, marking off entirely different conceptions and positions, but Lynch men-
tions none of them. If the relativity here, admittedly a kind of relativism, needed 
any comment at all, why leave it at “moral relativism,” as if that were a neat and 
tidy category? Why not go ahead and say, if anything at all, specifically that this 
is an example of descriptive moral relativism, given that it is obviously free of 
any normative or metaethical undertones? Mitias qualifies what he says here, 
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twice with “may seem,” once with “viewed as,” making sure, for good measure, 
to wrap scare quotes around the word “morality” at the end. The entire report is 
descriptive, containing no hint of assent, approval, or recommendation. 
This tentative description, peppered with qualifications as if treading on egg-
shells, is hardly the approach Mitias subsequently follows in his forceful claims 
regarding friendship. Lynch nevertheless launches her critique as if Mitias himself 
considered the morality of slavery a relative matter, or applauded the Greeks for 
doing so, while declaring friendship a universal moral value. Why would any-
one passionately championing the intrinsic value of being human, as grounded 
in nothing other than being human, consider it a relative matter whether it is mor-
ally right or wrong for human beings to enslave one another? 
Since Lynch is also opposed to rhetorical questions, particularly when they 
are “overused” (2014, 788), let me at least answer that one: I do not know why  
a humanist would not reject slavery outright, as I was merely fishing for agree-
ment to rule out that likelihood in the first place. I do know this, however: It is 
not a contradiction to praise the ancient Greeks for recognizing a universal mor-
al value (friendship) without condemning them for failing to recognize another 
universal moral value (freedom).25 This is not the same as affirming the univer-
sality of the first and denying that of the second. 
It is interesting to note that Mitias is careful to distance himself explicitly not 
just from moral relativism but also from cultural relativism: 
 
“This does not necessarily entail an espousal of cultural relativism, nor does 
it entail a denial of individual conscience, the ability of the citizen to criti-
cize the laws and practices of society, or the ability to grow in the capacities 
of knowing, feeling, and acting. Human beings can actualize themselves in 
their culture and at the same time grow autonomously as human beings” 
(Mitias, 2012a, 55). 
 
But even if Mitias does not, strictly speaking, contradict himself, does he 
distort, or obfuscate, the evidence? That is the second aspect of Lynch’s objec-
tion. She accuses Mitias of manipulating cultural paradigms to emphasize or 
promote cultural indicators favorable to the conclusions he intends to draw, 
specifically with respect to their morality, while ignoring or downplaying any 
indicators that might be inimical to those conclusions. Her prime example of 
this—as evident in her reference to “the totalising narrative noted above” (2014, 
787)—is that Mitias privileges friendship but not slavery (the latter of which 
may, incidentally, be adduced as evidence of agreement by Lynch herself that 
Mitias does not consider the morality of slavery a relative matter) despite com-
parable Greek affinity for both. 
————————— 
25 What the Greeks failed to recognize, of course, was not the value of freedom but the 
universality of that value. Freedom was good, to be sure, just not for everyone. 
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Yet Lynch ignores a crucial difference between the concepts of friendship 
and slavery as discussed by Mitias in the context of cultural and moral para-
digms. Friendship is a central moral value, not just for this or that culture but for 
any culture, because it is an ontological need: a need that arises from our exist-
ence, and defines our essence, as human beings, which therefore makes it  
a condition of human excellence. Slavery, in contrast, does not come with  
a comparable ontology. Hence, when Mitias protests the absence of one but not 
the other, he is not doing so arbitrarily, or manipulatively, but in accordance 
with an objective appraisal grounded in values he deems universal. It is one 
thing to reject the underlying ontology of morality (which Lynch does not even 
address), quite another to ignore it altogether in finding a contradiction or ma-
nipulation where neither exists (which Lynch manages to find anyway). 
Given that Lynch repeatedly emphasizes (within the space of three pages and 
not in admiration) a tendency she reports in Mitias to “repeatedly emphasise” 
(2014, 787–788) claims he considers important, the irony of her missing a ra-
ther important one, besides the one in the preceding paragraph, seems to bear 
repeated emphasis here: Mitias’s thesis regarding the absence of friendship as  
a central moral value concerns its neglect by thinkers (primarily philosophers 
and theologians) engaged in moral discourse. Such neglect may perhaps have 
been culturally ubiquitous in the medieval period, when philia was firmly dis-
placed by agape, not just among scholars but also among ordinary people, but 
Mitias makes it clear that friendship was, as far as he can tell, an integral part of 
the cultural paradigm of the modern period, enjoying a comparable presence in 
the contemporary period as well. He, in fact, blames philosophers for their fail-
ure to tap into their own cultural paradigms to bring out the value already at-
tached to friendship there. 
However, in spite of all indications to the contrary, including explicit state-
ments by Mitias himself, Lynch misconstrues Mitias as declaring friendship 
absent from the cultural and moral paradigms of the modern and contemporary 
periods. She then doubles her error by misconstruing him as finding such para-
digms superior or inferior relative to his predilection for what is and is not  
included. This comes out in her references, quoted in full above, to “Mitias’ 
argument for the superiority of cultural paradigms which recognise the moral 
worth of friendship” and to “his claim that the medieval, modern, and contem-
porary paradigms are inferior because they fail to recognise friendship as a cen-
tral moral value” (Lynch, 2014, 787). Mitias has no such argument, makes no 
such claim. His point is not that one paradigm is superior to the other but that 
philosophers must be aware of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
paradigms of their respective cultures. 
Mitias is particularly critical of moral philosophers, saddling them, as 
touched upon in the preceding section on Gehrman, with the dual obligation to 
be sensitive but not slavish to their own cultural and moral paradigms (as in the 
Janus metaphor, 2012a, 29, cf. 63–65, 149). What Lynch misses here is that 
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Mitias takes ethicists to task for two different things: (1) for being slavish to 
their own cultural and moral paradigms in contradiction of the demands of rea-
son and observation, as in the medieval period, where friendship as a preferen-
tial relationship between human beings in an existential association was largely 
displaced by one’s relationship with God through a divine and eternal bond; 
(2) for being out of touch with their own cultural and moral paradigms, as in the 
modern and contemporary periods, where friendship was included in the para-
digm but neglected by philosophers engrossed in and therefore distracted by the 
prospects of drawing conclusions as reliable as the results achieved by scientists 
through the newfound emphasis on reason and observation facilitating break-
throughs in science and technology. The first is the problem with philosophers 
in the medieval period, the second with those in the modern and contemporary 
periods. Lynch reduces both to a matter of arbitrary affinities Mitias has for what-
ever he considers present or missing in the relevant cultural and moral paradigms. 
 
4.4. Ben Mulvey: Big Picture 
 
Mulvey (2013) offers the briefest commentary of all. It is largely expository 
and entirely accurate. He identifies the thesis and the strategy and proceeds 
from there to an outline of the establishment of the former by the latter. His 
exposition of Mitias is preceded by an overview of the subject matter. Begin-
ning with his own observations on friendship and moral theory, Mulvey reports 
a growing scholarly interest in the concept of friendship and suggests that the 
trend may be linked to “a renewed interest in the sort of ethics of virtue devel-
oped by Aristotle among contemporary philosophers” (2013). The association 
he makes between friendship and virtue ethics in general is precisely the con-
nection I have been trying to expose and illustrate in the approach followed by 
Mitias in particular, not just in his treatise on the subject but throughout the last 
ten years of his scholarly output, independently of style or genre. 
The main evaluative judgment Mulvey offers is that the unjustifiability of 
the absence of friendship from moral discourse in the medieval, modern, and 
contemporary periods “only makes sense within the context of Mitias’s under-
standing of the nature and task of moral theory” (Mulvey, 2013). This mirrors 
my own thinking in bringing together literary and philosophical considerations 
toward a proper evaluation, an initiative which represents a comprehensive ap-
proach to Mitias’s moral philosophy, which he is keen on expressing more of-
ten, and most vividly, as a storyteller. One reason for all the novels and poetry 
alongside the recent treatise is that, as Mulvey notes, “Mitias has decisive, 
though controversial, ideas about just what he thinks philosophers ought to be 
doing and how they ought to conceive of their primary task” (2013). The varie-
ty, no doubt, helps him expand his options for reaching the right audience. 
The target audience, at least in the case of Friendship: A Central Moral Val-
ue (2012a), is professional philosophers, especially ethicists, on whom Mitias 
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relies to reach out to a broader audience to help correct a problem that concerns 
everyone. Mulvey turns out to be one of the links in the chain as he receives and 
delivers the message exactly as transmitted: 
 
“Those who count themselves fortunate when they have accumulated many 
Facebook ‘friends’ would do well to consider Mitias’s insight that friendship 
‘is not founded in advantage but in love, the kind that fosters human devel-
opment’ (201) and that ‘mutual understanding, respect, and trust [...] are 
necessary conditions of friendship’ (202). This sort of love, of course, is not 
easy to find. But, as Mitias, shares, ‘from the assumption that it is hard to at-
tain it does not necessarily follow that we can afford to neglect it, ignore it, 
or belittle its significance’ (202)” (Mulvey, 2013). 
 
What is particularly telling in this regard is Mulvey’s personal choice in ad-
dressing a community whose conception of friendship has gradually been re-
duced to remote relationships through social media. That decision both reflects 
and reinforces his intuitive vision of the social psychology responsible for 
growing scholarly attention to friendship: “Perhaps current books on friendship 
are like SOS signals for desperate cultures” (Mulvey, 2013). Indeed, Mitias 
himself is desperate to attract our attention to anonymous angels in distress, 
hoping to inspire us to realize the full potential of our humanity. Nothing less 
can save a morality in crisis or a philosophy off course. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Neither the literary nor the philosophical considerations taken up here are 
decisive on their own. The literary perspective brings out a comprehensive mor-
al outlook common to everything Mitias stands for, but it offers no justification 
for why that moral outlook itself is worthy of consideration. The philosophical 
perspective supplies the justification but remains disconnected from the whole, 
as the focus is exclusively on exploring friendship as a central moral value. 
Despite their individual limitations, however, they work well in combination. 
The first reveals the true extent of what the second accomplishes, while the 
second shows why the first is tenable, perhaps even compelling. 
To elaborate, the literary interpretation illustrates how and why everything 
Mitias writes, at least within the relevant scope of consideration, is an invitation 
to virtue, specifically through love and friendship. That illustration is not suffi-
ciently indicative for the principal work under consideration, his only treatise on 
the subject, where the mode of treatment calls for an analysis of the assump-
tions, observations, and arguments in the corresponding position. This is where 
the philosophical appraisal comes in, demonstrating that the recognition of 
friendship as a central moral value is best achieved through virtue ethics, the 
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point proven being not necessarily that Mitias is right but that we ought to em-
brace virtue ethics if he is. 
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